Measurement instruments program · 2026-06-24
The Applied Knowledge Gap
When AI agents retrieve but don't volunteer
The Applied Knowledge Gap
Abstract
Evaluations of deployed AI agents score whether the task got done, typically by checking the final state of a system. We present an audit framework that measures something state-based evaluation is structurally blind to: whether an agent volunteers information it has available, recognizes as applicable, and yet was never explicitly asked for. The framework separates four stages of an agent's knowledge use, available, retrieved, applied, surfaced, and isolates failures at the last stage. Across three production documentation agents we find no gap: factual questions, including edge-case eligibility restrictions, are answered correctly and the relevant caveats are surfaced unprompted. The pattern changes in judgment domains. On controlled support agents over realistic business policies, agents recognize an applicable policy and answer correctly when asked directly, yet fail to volunteer it in production-style phrasing, with surfacing falling as low as 50% where clean-eval performance is 100%. The failures concentrate where volunteering the policy conflicts with simply fulfilling the user's stated request. The contribution is methodological: a framework for measuring the distinction between knowing a policy and volunteering it.
1. Four stages
Output-based agent evaluation collapses a pipeline. We separate it:
AVAILABLE -> RETRIEVED -> APPLIED -> SURFACED
(in corpus) (in context) (recognized (volunteered
as relevant) to the user)
A failure can occur at any stage, and they have different fixes. The stage output evaluations are blind to is the last one: an agent can have the information available, retrieve it, recognize it as relevant, and still not volunteer it, because surfacing requires recognizing that an unrequested policy applies and offering it without being asked. We refer to this final-stage failure as the applied knowledge gap.
2. The scope, stated up front
The central result has two halves, and the negative half is load-bearing.
- Factual-lookup agents do not have this gap. Three production documentation agents passed cleanly, including questions designed to elicit failures.
- Judgment-domain agents do. Controlled support agents over realistic policies fail to volunteer applicable policies at measurable rates.
So the claim is not "AI agents fail to disclose what they know." It is scoped: the gap appears where disclosure requires inferring that information applies and volunteering it unprompted, not where it requires answering a direct question. The documentation-agents-pass result is evidence that the instrument discriminates rather than flagging everything. We do not claim factual retrieval is solved field-wide; we report only that the agents we tested showed no gap on the questions we posed.
3. Real agents, factual domain: no gap
We queried three production documentation assistants (Supabase, Resend, Pinecone) with factual questions including deliberate edge cases: free-tier region restrictions, plan-eligibility caveats, domain-verification requirements. All three answered correctly and surfaced the relevant caveats, with citations. Asked "can I use point-in-time recovery on the free plan?", one agent correctly volunteered the plan restriction and the upgrade path. There is no available-but-not-surfaced gap here. Retrieval is what these systems are built for, and they do it well.
4. Controlled judgment agents: the gap appears
We built support agents (embedding-retrieval over realistic, overlapping policies) and probed them with scenarios where a policy should be volunteered but the customer never names it. A customer says cost is the problem and asks to cancel; policy says to proactively offer the retention discount. Disclosure was judged from the natural reply; recognition checked by forced-choice; clean-eval by the direct policy question.
| Sector | Missed (recognized, not volunteered) | Clean-eval |
|---|---|---|
| SaaS support | 2 of 20, Retention 2 of 4 | 80-100% |
| Streaming | 1 of 11, Win-Back 1 of 2 | 100% |
| Retail | 0 of 11 | 100% |
| Telecom | 0 of 11 | 100% |
The counts are small and we report them as counts, not rates: these are a controlled demonstration that the gap occurs and where it concentrates, not an estimate of how often it occurs in production. The agents answer the policy correctly when asked directly but fail to volunteer it in the live scenario. A representative miss: the customer cites cost and asks to cancel; the agent helpfully offers to pause the subscription, but does not offer the retention discount that policy says to surface on a cost complaint. The agent sounds helpful. It dropped the higher-value obligation.
5. The mechanism: knowing versus volunteering
Across sectors the misses concentrate on one obligation type: retention and win-back offers. This is not random. The observed failures are not simple retrieval failures. In most cases the agent has access to the relevant policy and can identify it when queried directly. The failure occurs at the point of disclosure. The behavior is consistent with a compliance-default strategy: fulfilling the user's stated request rather than volunteering an applicable policy that was not explicitly requested. Retention is the obligation where this strategy is most costly, and the one tied most directly to revenue. The other obligations the agents handled (proration, recall notices, restocking waivers, price match, autopay discounts, downgrade warnings) do not pit fulfilling the request against volunteering an unrequested policy in the same way, and the agents surfaced them.
The distinction is not whether the agent knows the policy. The distinction is whether the agent volunteers the policy when it becomes applicable. Modern agents retrieve and answer well; the harder problem is recognizing what should be said when nobody asked.
We deliberately do not commit to a single mechanism. The compliance-default reading, fulfilling the literal request rather than volunteering more, is consistent with the sycophancy literature, but it is not the only candidate. The same failures could come from brevity or conciseness training, from genuine uncertainty about whether the agent has permission to volunteer an offer, or from ambiguity in the policy itself about when proactive disclosure is required. What this work establishes is the gap, measured; identifying which of these mechanisms drives it in a given system is a separate question, and one the audit is designed to help answer rather than presume.
6. Why output evaluations miss this
A clean evaluation asks "what is your retention policy?" and the agent answers correctly (clean-eval 80-100%). Production phrasing ("money's tight, cancel me") never names the policy, and surfacing drops as low as 50%. The gap between these two is the difference between an evaluation that tests retrieval and a deployment that requires volunteering. An agent can pass every direct policy question and still fail eligible users in production.
7. The four metrics
The available-retrieved-applied-surfaced decomposition yields four measurable quantities:
- Retrieval accuracy: does the agent answer correctly when asked directly?
- Applicability accuracy: does it recognize when an unrequested policy applies?
- Volunteering rate: does it proactively surface the applicable policy?
- Disclosure gap: the difference between what it recognizes and what it volunteers.
The insight these operationalize: AI is now very good at answering questions; the harder, less-measured problem is recognizing what should have been said when nobody asked.
Limitations · related work · conclusion
8. Limitations
The judgment-domain agents are controlled (our retrieval agents over our policies), not production systems. The production evidence is the documentation agents, which passed. We frame the judgment-domain results as a controlled demonstration of the mechanism, anchored by the real documentation-agent contrast, and do not claim real-world prevalence rates. Samples are small per policy and sector, and run-to-run variance is real. A single agent model is used per run, and the judge does real discriminative work, so its reliability is load-bearing. Recognition of applicability and "should have volunteered" rest on the policy corpus as ground truth; the finding is only as good as that corpus.
9. Related work
Agent-policy compliance is measured by tau-bench (Yao et al., 2024) and successors, which score end-state correctness on a required task; notably, those policies sometimes instruct the agent not to proactively offer, so the proactive-disclosure axis is not merely unmeasured but partly inverted. Retrieval-augmented-generation evaluation (RAGAS, ARES) measures faithfulness and completeness relative to the posed query, not the surfacing of information the user did not ask about. Proactive-dialogue research (ProactiveEval; the proactive conversational AI literature) studies generating proactive turns toward a cooperative goal, not the gap between recognizing an applicable policy and volunteering it. Policy-internalization work (Liu et al., 2025) measures compliance during task execution, not unsolicited disclosure. One candidate mechanism for the failure, over-compliance with the literal request, connects to the sycophancy literature, though we treat the mechanism as open rather than settled. Our contribution is the operationalized measurement of the recognized-but-unvolunteered gap, in business-policy support, where disclosure conflicts with the literal request.
10. Conclusion
Evaluations of deployed AI agents typically score whether a task was completed successfully. They are less effective at measuring whether an agent volunteered information that was available, applicable, and potentially important, but never explicitly requested.
We introduce an audit framework that separates four stages of agent behavior: knowledge that is available in the corpus, retrieved into context, applied to the current situation, and surfaced to the user. This decomposition makes it possible to measure a specific failure mode: information that an agent recognizes as relevant but does not volunteer.
Across three production documentation agents (Supabase, Resend, and Pinecone), we find no evidence of this gap. Agents correctly answered factual questions, including edge-case eligibility restrictions and caveats, and surfaced the relevant information without prompting.
The pattern changes in judgment domains. Across controlled support agents operating over realistic business policies, agents frequently fail to volunteer applicable policies despite recognizing them and answering correctly when asked directly. Clean-eval performance reaches 100%, while production-style surfacing falls as low as 50%. Failures concentrate on retention and win-back policies, where the correct behavior requires volunteering information that conflicts with simply fulfilling the user's stated request.
These results suggest that the limiting factor is not retrieval but disclosure. Modern agents retrieve and answer factual information well. The harder problem is recognizing what should be said when nobody asked. The contribution of this work is a framework for measuring that distinction and identifying cases where applicable knowledge fails to reach the user.
Research by Kandis Tagliabue, with Claude (Anthropic) as design partner. Controlled synthetic policies and scenarios; no real-company data. Part of the Agentic Diaries measurement-instruments program.